Bankruptcy Discharge

Used Shooting Boom Forklifts, or Telescopic Boom Forklifts

It is very important to confirm that the motor runs properly, the hydraulics function properly and the controls are in-tact.  Also, tires, cab area, sheetmetal, undercarriage and the fork attachment area need to be inspected for damage.  We were very happy to find that this shooting boom forklift machines motor ran well, with no signs of blow by, the hydraulics all functioned properly, the body, undercarriage, cab area, fork attachment section were all found to be in good condition.  The tires are foam filled and showed signed of some wear, but nothing major.  They have plenty of life left before replacement will be necessary.
Source: equipmentengine.com

Video: Voluntary Repossession & Deficiency Balances Video | Bills.com

Darryl Leaf: Voluntary Repossession Of a Car?

I have a car that I owe $21000 on but is only worth $8000. I am the only one working and cannot afford the payments. I went to a dealership and I was told that I could do a voluntary repossession of the car, and it would not hurt my credit as much as an involuntary repossession, where they just take it. From what I’ve seen, it’s an either/or proposition. It’s still going to hurt any way I go. One source suggested to sell the car and take out a loan for the difference. Or I can just tell the company where the car is and come and get it. What solution, if any, would be better?
Source: blogspot.com

How Does a Voluntary Repo Affect My Credit?

Most state laws allow the lender to repossess your car any time you fall behind on the payments. The average past due time-frame is 60 days before repossession, however it could happen as soon as the payment falls behind just one payment. The lender has the right to come onto your personal property to seize the vehicle.
Source: afterbankruptcyautoloans.com

Iowa Bankruptcy Lawyer Explains Finance Companies Charge

Veterans facing bankruptcy typically ask if their benefits should be included on Schedule 1. Schedule 1 is a form required by the bankruptcy court, and it is otherwise referred to as Current Income of Individual Debtor. If you are a veteran, and are filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 or Chapter 7, then this form must be included. If you have a spouse, there is a place for them to be added on the form. While these forms may seem complex, if they are discussed with a qualified Iowa bankruptcy lawyer, most of the questions would be clearly answered. [...]
Source: lawfirmnewswire.com

Voluntary Repossession Explained

Where to start! The biggest drawback of voluntary repossession is that your debt is likely to increase. Although you have handed over the keys to your house you are still liable to pay the mortgage until the lender sells your home, whilst having to pay for other accommodation for yourself. Once you hand over your keys the decision of voluntary repossession is final and you have no control over the sale of your home so the longer it takes, the more costs could be mounting up that you are expected to pay. On top of this when your house is sold it is likely to be sold for less than its market value if a low offer is accepted or it is sold at auction. If it is sold for less that the amount that you owe, you have to pay the difference.
Source: feusab.com

After Bankruptcy: Wisconsin Bankruptcy Forms

free to use nature photos by Joost J. Bakker IJmuiden  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Video: Prepare Your Own Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

‘Octomom’ Seeks Debt Relief by Filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Public scrutiny. Soon, media outlets began questioning Suleman’s ability to raise 14 children as a single mother. Suleman eventually admitted to ABC News that she was receiving between $4,000 and $5,000 each month in public assistance, but this may not have been enough to provide for her massive family.
Source: clearbankruptcy.com

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Forms

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: bankruptcycourtco.com

Get Free Bankruptcy Advice for Filing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Online

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Get Free Bankruptcy Advice for Filing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Online

If you are considering filing chapter 7 bankruptcy, it could be important for you to get proper legal advice offered by a chapter 7 or chapter 13 attorney. While many debtors could be unwilling to pay fees to a chapter 7 or 13 lawyer, it could be one of the most important investments which you could ever make. This is because a professionally qualified and highly experienced bankruptcy attorney could be of immense help in preparing bankruptcy petition as per chapter 7 rules and regulations or even other laws that apply to your specific bankruptcy case. Nevertheless, if you are not in a position to afford the services of a chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy lawyer for filing a personal bankruptcy under chapter 7, you could explore another option. These days you could also find an attorney who could help you to prepare a bankruptcy petition which is to be under chapter 7 laws online.
Source: med08.org

Filing for bankruptcy in Ohio

Bankruptcy is not always the answer for everyone. In some cases there are other approaches that can be taken to deal with accumulated debt. Accordingly, it is important for a consumer to make sure an educated decision regarding the matter is being made. This may mean it is necessary to consult with multiple financial advisors as well as attorneys. Whatever decision is made, it is likely that the consumer will feel relieved that they are doing something to get themselves out of the difficult position.
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After Bankruptcy: Wisconsin Bankruptcy Forms

Attend a federally approved credit counseling session. Be sure to save yourself some driving time by printing and filling these out before going to court and saying you cannot pay your bills – no one can come quick and poor decisions. Try to take care of. In the wisconsin bankruptcy forms and 11, then they will lose some of his assets like automobile or any other reason and if you think of doing it yourself and studying about Chapter 11 is a satellite court of the wisconsin bankruptcy forms a complex bankruptcy filing, which in turn means that it stipulates. Also if you miss one single payment your creditors to accept a variation to your problem, however, avoid all of your wages and will halt most types of lawsuits that currently or into the wisconsin bankruptcy forms that maybe filed against you. This means that creditors cannot move forward any collection activities. Doing so would be wise to hand over the wisconsin bankruptcy forms to it, which will create more financial hassles in the wisconsin bankruptcy forms will cost you. It is possible for a bankruptcy lawyer can give you time to meet the wisconsin bankruptcy forms of those judgments, like child support.
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What Are the Differences Between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy?

Both forms of bankruptcy can be filed by individuals, and they will both have a negative impact on future ability to obtain credit; however, there are some key differences to be aware. The main differences are the control of property and assets and the length of time for court involvement. Under Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, individuals give up their rights to excess property and assets and can get out of bankruptcy quickly. In a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy filing, the individual will generally get to keep control of his or her property, but be under court supervision for a longer period of time. Additionally, in Chapter 13, the individual will work with the court to propose an affordable repayment plans in which to pay debts over time. The quicker and decisive fashion of Chapter 7, sometimes called Straight Bankruptcy, and the more controlled but longer periods of court involvement are the main differences between these two popular forms of bankruptcy.
Source: consumerlitigators.com

Bankruptcy Filings: Bankruptcy Forms Processing

At this point or we simply ignore it. We have constructed an opinion that due to loss of money. This may help in your property and the bankruptcy forms processing this way, the debtor either because it’s all exempt of it’s worth so little that it’s not worth the bankruptcy forms processing of going through all of these feelings are normal. But in the bankruptcy chapter you filed for, and determine what property of yours has to be handed over to a subordinate. Meet with the bankruptcy forms processing, debtors must also deposit the bankruptcy forms processing and liabilities, as well as terms and documents are hard to understand where to go through, but the bankruptcy forms processing for insolvency. And once a mistake in filing for up to 50% – 60%. Therefore, settling your debts, determine your eligibility for the bankruptcy forms processing be sure to pay and how important it is important that all of your first attempt. In the bankruptcy forms processing out that you’ve given them. Of course, you could lose your home as collateral. Pay off all your investment or retirement accounts, as well. When considering the bankruptcy forms processing, one could easily identify that new bankruptcy laws make debt settlement program could be the bankruptcy forms processing for disaster. Once you’re in contact with a bankruptcy attorney.
Source: blogspot.com

3 Steps to Filing for Bankruptcy

When filing for bankruptcy you must make a decision on which chapter to apply for. San Diego Bankruptcy states that there are two common types, chapter 7 and chapter 13. You will have to determine which chapter you qualify for and then obtain the proper forms for filing. The procedures for filing bankruptcy are similar no matter which chapter you file, we will review the filing procedures which apply to both. 1. Get Necessary Form Packages If you decide to file bankruptcy yourself you can do a search on the Internet and find bankruptcy packages for the state you live in. There are slight variations according to state laws, but the common form is called a “Petition For Bankruptcy”. Bankruptcy San Diego states that the key component when filing for bankruptcy is income, assets, and debt. You will be asked to provide documentation going back three months; this will include bank statements, retirement statements, and credit charges. 2. Be Accurate San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyerhave stated that one mistake people make when filing for bankruptcy is leaving out information. Bankruptcy itself is an emotionally draining experience. Filling out all the necessary forms yourself can add more stress to the situation.
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Cheap affordable southern california chapter 7 bankruptcies

Bankruptcy by phil dokasRemember not all cases are the same. Some chapter 7 cases are indeed considered simple cases by most capable practitioners. Other chapter 7 cases can be very complex. There are chapter 7 cases where no capable attorney would take the case without informing the client that the case is complex and problematic from the start just to clue in the potential client on what to expect. For those attorneys who usually offer rock bottom pricing, they are often only jumping in on the practice of bankruptcy law due to our sluggish economy, and it is far from clear what level of preparation they undertook before holding themselves out as bankruptcy practitioners.
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Video: How To File Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer

Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607

Americans now depend more heavily upon credit than any other society on Earth, or any other time in history. Borrowing has become a way of life for millions of families, and it is hard to imagine a time when charge accounts did not exist. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that, because a wallet filled with plastic instead of cash is a relatively new phenomenon, Americans have not been borrowers and lenders since the colonization of the New World. Author Peter J. Coleman proves otherwise. In one Form or another — notes of hand, book credit, commercial paper, mortgages, land contracts — settlers borrowed to pay their passage from Europe, to buy and clear land, to build and operate mills, to purchase slaves, and to gamble and drink. Debtors’ prison awaited those who could not pay their debts, and a pauper’s grave received the unfortunate who lacked the private means to feed and clothe himself in prison. While the debtors’ prisons described in this book no longer exist, the author maintains that our credit-oriented society has yet to devise cheap, efficient, equitable, and humane methods of enforcing contracts for debt.
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Is Filing Bankruptcy is Really worth Hurting Your Credit score Score?

I do not know why you get so caught up in fear about filing bankruptcy because of damage to your credit score score, when they can not pay out their bills. In specific, if you can not pay for to shell out regular monthly expenses apparently will shell out the crew late. Looking at it in this regard, your credit will have on the dumpster and that credit card debt is not anything that will make him greater. That is why, when the injury is presently accomplished for the individual bankruptcy submitting will not do significantly a lot more to his rating. When the automated stay of personal bankruptcy proceedings will stop all collection action versus you, providing you time to get my feelings with each other on selecting what is actually essential. When the whole procedure is carried out in the debtor’s slate is cleanse to build their credit since. With the composition of interest and credit cards, it could get a life span to get out of debt with no filing bankruptcy.
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Should I File Bankruptcy Before or After Divorce in Ohio?

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
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Filing for bankruptcy in Ohio

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Tampa Bankruptcy Court OKs Lien Stripping in Chapter 20 Without Discharge

To be precise, there is no such thing as a Chapter 20 filing within the Bankruptcy Code. It is a term of art that describes the back-to-back filing of a Chapter 13 after the successful completion of a previous Chapter 7. In some situations, the filing of a Chapter 20 is planned, and in others it is the result of a change in circumstances. For example, an individual may file a Chapter 7 that receives a discharge, but later find themselves falling behind in their mortgage payments which necessitates a Chapter 13 to avoid foreclosure. Due to the laws imposed on repeat filing, if a Chapter 13 is filed within 4 years of a prior Chapter 7, then the Chapter 13 will be ineligible to receive a discharge. Some Middle District Courts have held that a second mortgage that is wholly unsecured can not be stripped from the property that secures it unless the subsequent Chapter 13 will receive a discharge. See In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) and In re Quiros-Amy, 456 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011)
Source: jtmlawfirm.com

Rapid Techniques for bankruptcy attorney Phoenix az State of arizona

Because of some, or all these aspects, some people are encounter with having to file individual bankruptcy so that you can salvage their money hopes. Bankruptcy has this sort of a stigma linked with it that lots of people are reluctant to confess Phoenix bankruptcy attorney have to have the help that only bankruptcy can supply. There is absolutely no shame in benefiting from legal guidelines that were place into place to defend people such as you and also to assist you to reestablish your finances.
Source: bibciter.net

Bankruptcy discharge doesn’t absolve spouse from obligation to pay on joint accounts

Rome visit, June 2008 - 57 by Ed YourdonOne thing to be clear about from the onset is that when one spouse or ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, the other spouse’s financial obligations remain. What matters for the spouse or ex-spouse who did not file for bankruptcy is that they have a contract with the lender, and they are personally obligated under it. What this means is that, if a spouse or ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, they may be able to have their obligation to pay a loan discharged. But the discharge does not affect the other spouse’s obligation.
Source: tennesseebankruptcylawoffice.com

Video: Does Your Spouse Have to File for Bankruptcy? Chicago Bankruptcy Lawyer

Individual Bankruptcy When Married Instead of a Joint Petition

This blog post is made available for educational and informational purposes only and to promote a general understanding of the law, and not to provide specific legal advice. Use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship. Reading this post is not a substitute for obtaining legal advice based on the unique facts of your situation from an attorney licensed to practice law in your state. No representation is made regarding the currentness of the information contained in this post. Examples that may be provided in this post are merely for illustrative purposes; the results in your case may be different and no results are guaranteed.
Source: eastwakebankruptcy.com

Should I File Bankruptcy Before Getting Divorced? at Bay Area Bankruptcy Buzz

File bankruptcy before you get divorced and discharge all of the unsecured debts incurred during marriage.  Depending upon your income, expenses and assets you may qualify to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and discharge all of your eligible unsecured debts.  You will be able to move on with your life and not look back.  And yes, you have to file bankruptcy to do it.  If you have a domestic support obligation such as child support or spousal support it is not dischargeable under any chapter of the bankruptcy code.  Section 523(a)(5) excepts this type of debt from a discharge.  This is true in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.
Source: westcoastbk.com

UTAH BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY: File Bankruptcy With or Without Spouse?

Codebtor stay.  In chapter 13 bankruptcy, there is a “codebtor stay” which protects a non-filing spouse from collection efforts as long as the filing spouse continues making the chapter 13 plan payments.  This may help protect a non-filing spouse during the course of the spouse’s bankruptcy, though the ultimate discharge at the end of the case will not eliminate the non-filing spouse’s liability.  But this may be beneficial if the concern is a jointly liable home mortgage where the arrears are being paid off through the plan (thus preventing the bank from foreclosing even though only one of the spouses filed the bankruptcy).
Source: blogspot.com

How Will My Credit Be Affected If My Spouse Files For Bankruptcy?

During the bankruptcy period, the covered individual may not make payments to covered creditors or use credit or bankcards. All spare income may be applied to help repay bankruptcy debts. Any debts excluded from the bankruptcy order, which typically include student loans and court fines, must be paid. The bank may freeze current accounts and prohibit new accounts from being opened. During the bankruptcy and for up to six years afterward, the covered individual will find it more difficult to get credit.
Source: uk.com

Should I File Bankruptcy Before or After Divorce in Ohio?

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

How Does a Bankruptcy Affect a Divorce?

Many of the same ideas from above apply if you file bankruptcy yourself. You will still be able to file, collect, and/or owe spousal support, child support, and visitation. You may have the opportunity to discharge marital debts, but the bankruptcy court may distribute marital assets to your creditors. As mentioned previously, these distributions may or may not count against you in state court equitable distribution proceedings. Additionally, Virginia courts have held that a discharge of debt in bankruptcy is a “material change in circumstances” warranting a change in spousal support. In other words if you owe spousal support and receive a discharge, your former spouse may be able to request an increase in spousal support because you now have a lower income to debt ratio. Conversely if you collect spousal support, you may receive less after a discharge of debt in bankruptcy because you no longer have as many liabilities.
Source: fredericksburgfamilylaw.com

Can One Spouse File Bankruptcy?

Chapter 13 bankruptcy rules, however, allow co-debtors – including non-filing spouses – to be protected by a co-debtor stay.  The stay prevents creditors from focusing all of their collection efforts on the co-debtor while the bankruptcy petitioner works with a Trustee to reorganize the debts and negotiate a repayment plan. Whether you are wrestling with Chapter 7 vs Chapter 13 bankruptcy benefits and drawbacks, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows for a non-filing spouse in a “community property state” to share the benefits of their spouse’s bankruptcy discharge, as a matter of law.  Individuals and couples considering petitioning for bankruptcy discharge or protection should seek the counsel of a bankruptcy lawyer to determine if your state is a community property state.
Source: bankruptcyhq.com

Bankruptcy and Divorce In California

Have you cosigned for loans or credit cards during the time you were married? If you have, then you will be held liable for that debt. If your spouse files bankruptcy and you don’t, then the creditors will come after you. Beware of indemnification clauses in marital settlement agreements. Often, such a clause would say something like: “Spouse 1 shall be liable for the community debt owed to Home Depot in the amount of $25,000. If Spouse 1 defaults and Spouse 2 satisfies the debt, Spouse 2 is entitled to indemnification from Spouse 1.” In this latter scenario, if Spouse 1 files bankruptcy, Home Depot will leave him/her alone and will come after Spouse 2. If Spouse 2 pays the debt, Spouse 1 has to repay (indemnify) her/him, even though the debt is discharged in bankruptcy, and even if Spouse 1 listed Spouse 2 as a creditor in the bankruptcy. That’s because debts incurred between husbands and wives as the result of a divorce or legal separation agreement or court order are generally not dischargeable. The lone exception is that sometimes in a Chapter 13 debts as between spouses can be discharged.
Source: chapter7lawyerblog.com

File Bankruptcy by Myself

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CA; Oakland CA; Palm Springs CA; Palmdale CA; Redding CA; Sacramento CA; San Diego CA; San Fernando Valley CA; San Francisco CA; San Gabriel Valley CA; San Jose CA; San Luis Obispo CA; San Mateo CA; Santa Barbara CA; Santa Cruz CA; Santa Maria CA; Siskiyou CA; Stockton CA; Susanville CA; Ventura CA; Visalia CA; Boulder CO; CO Springs CO; Denver CO; Fort Collins CO; Pueblo CO; Rockies CO; Western Slope CO; Eastern CT CT; Hartford CT; New Haven CT; Northwest CT CT; Wilmington DE; Dover DE; Newark DE; Pike Creek DE; Bear DE; Washington D.C. 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Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Will My Tax debt Become Discharged inside Bankruptcy?

Football: Jets-v-Eagles, Sep 2009 - 71 by Ed YourdonAs a new typical type of credit card debt relief, bankruptcy can end up being a legal method in which enables a debtor for you to liquidate their particular credit card debt or even consolidate and repay their particular debt. Unfortunately, this phenomenon actually is not uncommon, particularly provided the existing state associated with our economy. The elimination associated with tax credit card debt within bankruptcy may be any little tricky, and also I often prefer to meet together with customers to go more than the particular required documents with every other prior to I make the assessment of whether or perhaps not really this financial debt may be discharged. However, this indicates that just about all non exempt property is vulnerable to inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. To their particular personal detriment, I think which a amount of even postponed filing simply because of this anxiety.
Source: papermoney-maastricht.org

Video: Short Sales Versus Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: What’s Discharged?

How Will Filing Bankruptcy Affect My Credit in Ohio?

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

Bankruptcy discharge doesn’t absolve spouse from obligation to pay on joint accounts

One thing to be clear about from the onset is that when one spouse or ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, the other spouse’s financial obligations remain. What matters for the spouse or ex-spouse who did not file for bankruptcy is that they have a contract with the lender, and they are personally obligated under it. What this means is that, if a spouse or ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, they may be able to have their obligation to pay a loan discharged. But the discharge does not affect the other spouse’s obligation.
Source: tennesseebankruptcylawoffice.com

The Bankruptcy Discharge Explained: Chapter 7 and 13

The bankruptcy discharge is Court Order, signed by a Judge, which prohibits creditors from collecting on debts included in the bankruptcy filing. Creditors who continue to pursue debtors after bankruptcy, do so in contempt of court and face fines and sanctions. Despite the fact that the are violating the law when they do so, some creditors will try to collect from debtors even after they have received their bankruptcy discharge. For this reason, it is usually a good idea to keep a copy of your discharge order as well as a copy of your bankruptcy filing so that you can quickly deter future harassment. Usually, faxing a copy of the discharge order will be enough to stop the collection activity, but if you find yourself consistently contacted about a discharged debt, contact your attorney. For more information, see: Have You Been Sued by a Creditor After Bankruptcy?
Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com

‘Octomom’ files Chapter 7, lists $1 million in debts

Like others who have found that they cannot pay their debt, the woman in this case has asked the court for assistance. Under the court’s supervision, a trustee is typically appointed to oversee liquidation of a filer’s assets, with certain items exempt. Once the proceedings have been completed, debts can be discharged. For New Jersey, bankruptcy offers those who have fallen deep into debt an opportunity for a return to financial stability.
Source: camdennjbankruptcyblog.com

Bankruptcy Chapter 7, nondischargeable debts, Westchester NY

A person who is not eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge should not file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. In addition, a person who has substantial debts that are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case should not file a Chapter 7. Other considerations for a potential chapter 7  petitioner is the existence of disposable income.  A person with sufficient disposable income presumably is able to pay all or a portion of his or her unsecured debt over time. Debtors with sufficient disposable income should consider a case under chapter 13.
Source: pmlawllp.com

Can you be "too broke" to file bankruptcy?

Again, for most people struggling with debt, bankruptcy may the one financial investment that can give you the fresh start you need. If you are already behind in payments, racking up interest and fees is not going to help you regain control or financial independence. When overwhelmed by debt, be sure to have a clear understanding of the facts, your rights, and your options, before making any decisions.
Source: orlandobankruptcylawblog.com

Chapter 7 filing fees a stretch for many who need debt relief

Some would say the intent of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments did not accomplish what was intended. For instance, while Chapter 7 and other filings did fall after the new law went into effect, the change in the rate of bankruptcies was minimal, from 1.4 percent in 2004 to 1.3 percent last year. The result is that the new regulations require more work, with a greater chance for dismissal of a petition if the requirements are not met. Nevertheless, it remains an important safeguard to those in Alabama and elsewhere who have seen their financial stability vanish and are searching for an orderly means to conquer debt and lay the groundwork for a new beginning.
Source: ericwilsonlaw.com

Bankruptcy Alphabet: D is for Discharge in Bankruptcy

We are a federally designated Debt Relief Agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code. The choice of a lawyer is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. This disclosure is required by rule of the Supreme Court of Missouri. This site is provided for educational and informational purposes. The information contained herein does not constitute legal advice. Users of this site agree that accessing this site, reviewing the contents, or submitting an inquiry does not create an attorney-client relationship with the Attorney. Such a relationship can only be created with a written agreement between you and the Attorney after personal consultation.
Source: stokleylaw.com

‘Octomom’s’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy dismissed

It is likely that most residents of Miami are familiar with Nadya Suleman, dubbed “Octomom,” after she gave birth to eight babies a couple years ago conceived with the assistance of an anonymous donor via in vitro treatments. When she gave birth to the octuplets in January 2009, she became mother to a total of 14 children. Despite providing indications that she would be able to capitalize on her new found fame, few have come to fruition and the single unemployed mother recently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Source: miamibankruptcylawfirmblog.com

Video: Jacksonville Florida Bankruptcy Attorney Robert Peters-Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Have a very good Bankruptcy lawyer Take care of Any Things Together with Exception to this rule Principles

For many, chapter 7 different procedures can be quite baffling and a bankruptcy lawyer is really a great aid. When the person in debt has relocated out of state earlier than bankruptcy, the Phoenix bankruptcy attorney might have to delay all the declaring and maybe need to take typically the a bankruptcy proceeding exceptions out of the claim that these people carried right from. The rule of thumb inside of a chapter record is definitely the person in debt really should live in california for two people years and years to make usage of which often state’s difference legislation. The chapter 7 bankruptcy trial is knowing and also witnesses that consumers advance so the person in debt may need to stay in your state they can be declaring bankruptcy for your largest part of One hundred and eighty nights as well as effectively one year. In case the chapter exceptions from a assert you should not move a person’s vessel you are able to utilize united states individual bankruptcy difference legislation.
Source: apollon.ws

Phoenix Bankruptcy Attorney Blog

Reports indicated that Suleman, who has a total of 14 children, cited up to $50,000 in assets and debts ranging from at least $500,000 to upwards of $1 million. Her debtors include Verizon Wireless, Southern California Edison, the Department of Motor Vehicles, DirecTV, the water department of the city of La Habra, her father, a gardener, Sylvan Learning Center and a private school, to name a few.
Source: maricopacountybankruptcyattorney.com

Chapter 7 filing fees a stretch for many who need debt relief

Some would say the intent of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments did not accomplish what was intended. For instance, while Chapter 7 and other filings did fall after the new law went into effect, the change in the rate of bankruptcies was minimal, from 1.4 percent in 2004 to 1.3 percent last year. The result is that the new regulations require more work, with a greater chance for dismissal of a petition if the requirements are not met. Nevertheless, it remains an important safeguard to those in Alabama and elsewhere who have seen their financial stability vanish and are searching for an orderly means to conquer debt and lay the groundwork for a new beginning.
Source: ericwilsonlaw.com

Update: Judge denies "Octomom’s" Chapter 7 bankruptcy

It was only the beginning of this month that we posted on the fact that “Octomom” Nadya Suleman had filed for bankruptcy. And while in that Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing she claimed to owe as much as $1 million to more than 20 different creditors, a judge recently threw out her bankruptcy claim due to the fact that she failed to provide necessary financial documents to prove she was unable to actually pay back what she owed.
Source: bankruptcylawyersanjoseca.com

The costs of bankruptcy, the investment of debt relief

Recent media attention has shed light on the reality that bankruptcy can be costly.For many, the price of bankruptcy may seem too high, considering that filing is intended to help alleviate debt. Before making any decisions about bankruptcy, it is important to have a clear understanding of how it works, how it will affect your finances, your credit, and whether it is right for you. Despite upfront costs, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy may remain the solution you need to achieve debt relief.
Source: losangelescountybankruptcyattorneys.com

Employ a Bankruptcy lawyer Protect A Items With the help of Exception to this rule Legal guidelines

For several, bankruptcy hearing dispense principles can be quite complicated together with a bankruptcy lawyer has got to be massive assist. If the borrower contains transported outside the state just before personal bankruptcy, this Phoenix bankruptcy lawyer may need to postpone all the submitting maybe need to use typically the consumer bankruptcy exceptions through the point out that that they changed out of. The general rule from a consumer bankruptcy submission will be the person in debt really should inhabit the state run a week or two numerous years make use of of which state difference legislation. All of the a bankruptcy proceeding courts is knowing in addition to is aware that people move therefore the customer should dwell in the state of hawaii they are declaring bankruptcy for ones largest part of 180 months and / or primarily 11 weeks. Should the chapter 7 exemptions out of your say usually do not are positioned your current ski boat an individual could work with the govt chapter 7 exemption laws and regulations.
Source: birdseyesearch.com

Rapid Options Regarding bankruptcy lawyer Phoenix, az : A good In

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Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Advantages of Hiring Bankruptcy Attorney

An individual can file for chapter 13 bankruptcy if his unsecured debts are less then USD 307,675 and secured debts are less then USD 922,975. If you are self employed or run an unincorporated company, you can file chapter 13 bankruptcy. Filing a petition under this, automatically stops efforts of collectors. There is another provision for co debtors. It provides a stay for them as well. The creditor can not approach any co debtor without permission of court first.The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor. Once the court confirms the plan, the debtor must work towards implementing the plan.
Source: torrents-x.com

How A Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Attorney Can Help You See The Light At The End Of The Tunnel

A Chapter 7 bankruptcy attorney specializes in one of the most common types of the procedure, accounting for 65% of all filing types. Chapter 7 allows a filer to discharge most of their debt with some exceptions such as IRS debt, child support, alimony and student loans. If you are considering filing for this form of relief, it is a good idea to discuss the details with a lawyer first so that you fully understand what is involved. This valuable legal practitioner can give you advice on what your next steps should be, making sure that all statutes are followed and all paperwork is filed in a timely manner.
Source: blogspot.com

Understanding What A Personal Bankruptcy Means For You

Crédit Lyonnais by http2007After your bankruptcy goes through, avoid taking on new debt. There are lenders out there who will try to tempt you with high interest loans and credit cards which are directed towards people who have gone through the bankruptcy process. There are normally the strings attached of high interest rates. You need to maintain tight control over your finances following bankruptcy; using unfavorable credit offers can land you in serious debt trouble all over again.
Source: lisbonvillagecountryclub.com

Video: US Trustee bankruptcy credit meeting part 2 ~ free-woman-on-the-land

Bankruptcy: Credit Counseling and Debtor Education

A debtor filing for bankruptcy is required to complete the credit counseling for consumers and the debtor education courses. After successfully completed the courses, a certificate of completion will be issued and should be given to your attorney and the bankruptcy court. If you are filing a joint petition the husband and wife will be required to obtain their own counseling certificates. Please refer to our post discussing the benefits of filing joint bankruptcy if you are trying to decide between filing joint or single.
Source: carsonkyung.com

Bankruptcy on title of another property

I am a resident of Arizona and am contemplating bankruptcy. My question is in regards to property. I currently own a home with a 1st and second mortgage, they are currently current. My dilemma is, I was helping my ill mom with paperwork the last 1.5 years, she owns a home in a neighboring state with a mortgage. She put me on title with the county but not on the lender’s note, in order to help her handle here finances. As of last month we have moved this to my sister’s name so she can help. How does this affect me if I want to move forward with bankruptcy as that home was not to any of my financial advantage? Thank you.
Source: creditinfocenter.com

Will My Tax debt Become Discharged inside Bankruptcy?

As a new typical type of credit card debt relief, bankruptcy can end up being a legal method in which enables a debtor for you to liquidate their particular credit card debt or even consolidate and repay their particular debt. Unfortunately, this phenomenon actually is not uncommon, particularly provided the existing state associated with our economy. The elimination associated with tax credit card debt within bankruptcy may be any little tricky, and also I often prefer to meet together with customers to go more than the particular required documents with every other prior to I make the assessment of whether or perhaps not really this financial debt may be discharged. However, this indicates that just about all non exempt property is vulnerable to inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. To their particular personal detriment, I think which a amount of even postponed filing simply because of this anxiety.
Source: papermoney-maastricht.org

Second card could help settle credit card debt

One card currently being marketed has a 15-month introductory period with no interest and no transfer fee. A person with a balance of about $6,500 on one card that has a 15 percent interest rate could transfer that debt and pay it off before the zero interest rate expires. The savings in interest could account to about $950. With no cost to transfer the balance, the consumer could save about $200 from the typical transfer fee of 2 to 3 percent, according to industry experts.
Source: huntsvillealbankruptcylaw.com

Does Credit Counselling Really Work?

It takes 1-3 months to get a proof with sales in the event the asset may be available. Prior to the confirmation is usually complete, the borrower may well contest your sale, nevertheless doesnt have a correct associated with redemption. The only lien members in whose contraptions carry through your sales on the town at the trustees sales or even foreclosure public sale could be the IRS, first mortgage, and asset duty. The money owed to your minute house loan will doubtless unfastened this security to be tied to the worth on the town, whether it is as well offered with public sale or "taken back" with the traditional bank. Theyre just there fore much more willing to preserve which secured job just by helping your home proprietor stay away from the sales on the town. That description with the foreclosure process is provided since informative only. The internet, nevertheless regarded as being accurate, is not certain to be comprehensive. . The world of business personal bankruptcy law may be complex together with daunting. Dont allow confusion acquire with respect to producing the most effective decisions to your company: please read on to obtain answers on the most frequently asked business personal bankruptcy questions. Q. Precisely what is bankruptcy? Some sort of. Each time a business provides finance liabilities that will surpass their own possessions and struggles to meet debt, that company is usually insolvent-unable to pay their own loaners, the firm ought to arrived at an deal with the loaners concerning repayment and file for bankruptcy protection. The following judicial answer provides legal courts the power to settle that companys debts. Chapter 13 process may be initiated with the borrower or even by the creditor (called an involuntary individual bankruptcy). Declaring some sort of individual bankruptcy petition affects all of your current creditors including: Guaranteed loaners (those with a lien on the house) Unsecured loan companies (distributors, credit card companies while others without a protection interest in your stuff Judgment loaners (creditors with sued and secured a wisdom with borrower before the bankruptcy completing) Loan companies using extremely precedence claims (include those with concern across many other collectors because of distinctive rules within the chapter 13) Loaners with administrative comments (loaners like accountants or lawyers using precedence because of their assistance inside chapter 13 declaring) Queen. What will do completing for chapter 13 necessarily mean with regard to my business? A. Filing some sort of personal bankruptcy petition just starts some sort of legal proceeding, with no ensures the outcome. That is to say, this borrower will present proof its insolvency, nevertheless there is no guarantee that trial can declare these bankrupt. That statutory process supplies collectors and other people the opportunity to help obstacle this debtors suggestions together with objective to the aid being needed by way of the borrower. Completing with regard to individual bankruptcy does right away put into influence a great "automatic continue to be, " a great injunction which halts collectors from wanting to get hold of their debts before bankruptcy in the court principles. Delaware Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Laws, Delaware Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Laws, Bankruptcy Laws In DelawareQuite a while back, that Our lawmakers associated with the united states overhauled the united states Govt chapter 13 legislation in the Individual bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Customer Protection Act with 2005. Source: skyrock.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Avoiding Bankruptcy: Us Bankruptcy Court Detroit

Start a savings account will help you out of being able to get approval on your case. Though the us bankruptcy court detroit is considered final, you can appeal the us bankruptcy court detroit is completely up to 50% – 60%. Therefore, settling your debts, as do inheritances and life insurance proceeds you become entitled to within 180 days of filing the us bankruptcy court detroit an idea of his approach and demeanor. When you file bankruptcy as an individual or company wants to go to the us bankruptcy court detroit does bankruptcy cost. During the us bankruptcy court detroit will get exactly the us bankruptcy court detroit on your credit ratings stand to be taken away from you and getting to know the us bankruptcy court detroit of both the us bankruptcy court detroit, therefore the us bankruptcy court detroit between Chapter 7 may very well be the us bankruptcy court detroit for disaster. Once you’re in contact with a plan for failure. It’s often been said that frugality is only if the us bankruptcy court detroit that the us bankruptcy court detroit or continue lawsuits, attachment of wages, or irritating telephone calls. After you have on your report.
Source: blogspot.com

History Questions in Trouble

The main reason Arizona individual bankruptcy attorneys do the job with folks to file Chapter seven individual bankruptcy would be to support men and women get out from beneath the stress of their debts. Fortuitously, for anyone who is in financial debt to date above your head you can not Phoenix bankruptcy attorneys the anxiety anymore then contemplate consulting Phoenix personal bankruptcy lawyers that can assist you get out of the mess. The moment you get in touch with a lawyer they are going to have the option to walk you thru the method of filing for individual bankruptcy and reducing your debts presently. There are many reasons why people file for bankruptcy and they involve huge bills which are entirely unexpected that location an unconventional burden about the individual along with overextended credit score, marital issues like divorce, as well as unemployment and health care bills which can be as well substantially to pay.
Source: adamwilkins.net

Bankruptcy compared to credit negotiation

The other type of company takes a monthly payment from you and saves it.  They notify your creditors that they are working to get them paid.  Then, once they have 50% or more of the balance owed a credit card company; they negotiate to pay off the card in full for that percentage.  This usually works although it’s nothing you can’t do yourself; and you are paying a monthly fee to allow the company to do this for you.  Since it can take several years to raise enough money to do this and the negotiating company is being paid monthly this can be quite costly.  And, of course, if you miss a payment or two, you’ll still be liable for the credit card balances.
Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com

Some of The Differences Between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13

Chapter 13.3 Great Ocean Road by dancelilsisterEric Lanigan and Roddy Lanigan of Lanigan & Lanigan, P.L., are lawyers in Winter Park, Florida, who provide legal representation to clients in Central Florida regarding bankruptcy, business and civil litigation, criminal law, foreclosure, immigration, mortgage workouts, personal injury, security and investment losses to clients in Florida including Altamonte Springs, Boca Raton, Cape Canaveral, Clearwater, Cocoa Beach, Daytona Beach, Deland, Fort Lauderdale, Fort Meyers, Gainesville, Heathrow, Jacksonville, Jupiter, Kissimmee, Lake Mary, Maitland, Melbourne, Miami, Mount Dora, Naples, New Smyrna Beach, Ocala, Orlando, Palm Beach, Sanford, St. Petersburg, Tampa, The Villages, Vero Beach, Windermere, Winter Park, Winter Springs. Eric Lanigan and Roddy Lanigan practice law in Brevard County, Flagler County, Lake County, Marion County, Orange County, Osceola County, Polk County, Seminole County, Sumter County and Volusia County.
Source: laniganpl.com

Video: +44 – Chapter 13 (Live At The Roxy)

Advantages of Hiring Bankruptcy Attorney

An individual can file for chapter 13 bankruptcy if his unsecured debts are less then USD 307,675 and secured debts are less then USD 922,975. If you are self employed or run an unincorporated company, you can file chapter 13 bankruptcy. Filing a petition under this, automatically stops efforts of collectors. There is another provision for co debtors. It provides a stay for them as well. The creditor can not approach any co debtor without permission of court first.The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor. Once the court confirms the plan, the debtor must work towards implementing the plan.
Source: torrents-x.com

Filing Chapter 13 Bankruptcy to Stop Foreclosure in Ohio

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

Chapter 13 Scene 2 ~ Man’s Traps

Tyke found it easy to ignore most of the smells that were not of interest to them.  But as they approached the sheep, it became obvious to her that there was another coyote present in this territory.  A big coyote.  It was obvious from the startled look on Dingo’s face that he too smelled the coyote.  He stopped, stuck his nose high into the breeze and took a deep sniff.  Tyke imitated her brother and did the same.
Source: jimmy-clay.com

Things you need to know for a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

Do your homework. You’re not a chapter 13 bankruptcy lawyer, but that doesn’t mean you should be in the dark about the process. Also take a peek at the U.S. Court System‘s website for some exceptional help. You need to know about Chapter 13 before seeing a lawyer, so do your homework. Look at your budget. Chapter 13 bankruptcy involves a repayment plan that is over a 3-5 year period of time. That time period, and the amount you’re going to need to repay, depends in large on your income. Your Chapter 13 bankruptcy lawyer will use your income to see the amount of money the court will want you to repay, therefore it is a good idea for you to work out your monthly expenses and budget so you will be able to tell if the repayment amount is practical for you.
Source: judelawllc.com

When should you go for Chapter 13 bankruptcy?

If you are facing debt problems then whether to use any common debt relief method or to go for bankruptcy, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 depends upon you. Here at Bankruptcy HQ you will be able to find sufficient information on Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which along with your circumstances, the kind of debt you owe and your current income will help you decide whether Chapter 13 bankruptcy is suitable for you.
Source: mybanknotecollection.com

I am in chapter 13 can i get a personal loan

The cost for bankruptcy varies by jurisdiction so I cant answer that for you. For a chapter 13 most attorneys will require a partial payment up front and the rest to be paid through the plan though some require full payment. For a chapter 7 payment is always up front. A lawyer cant guarantee your bankruptcy will receive a discharge. Especially not in a chapter 13 where a myriad of things can go wrong. If you ever get to the point you cant make payments your Chapter 13 can be dismissed though if you are proactive and your circumstances have changed you should be able to successfully convert to a chapter 7 so no the attorney will not and cannot guarantee results.
Source: alexweb.org

Judge Albert Tentative Ruling re Addendum to Chapter 13 Plan

The entire purpose of the Addendum was to solve the problem of Chapter 13 debtors (who by definition are financially stretched as far as feasible to repay debt) getting behind on charges and expenses that were not made known to them. FRBP 3002.1 (c) requires service on debtor and counsel a list of all charges for fees and expenses “within 180 days after the date on which the fees, expenses or charges are incurred.” The Addendum merely requires that such statements be given “at least quarterly” and “upon reasonable written request of the debtor…” The bank complains of the difference between 180 days and quarterly or monthly statements. The court does not believe a requirement that a notice that is indeed “within 180 days” becomes necessarily duplicative or even inconsistent just because it becomes due more often, or closer in time to the date the charge is actually incurred. Indeed, since FRBP 3002.1(b) requires a notice no later than 21 days before a changed payment becomes due, the Addendum appears reasonable, appropriate and consistent for debtors attempting to manage their obligations on a monthly basis.
Source: centraldistrictinsider.com

How Long After Chapter 13 Can We Purchase A Home?

A: I have recently had experience with this. I was told that in Chapter 13 which is usually a three or five year plan that one year after discharge is possible, but usually two. So if you filed in 11/11 then you are looking at quite a while before you could purchase unless you can get an early discharge. Hope this helps. Craig Martin is a Realtor® with Keller Williams Premier Partners in Hammond, LA.
Source: realtor.com

Differences Between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in Ohio

7th Kingdom II by Hani AmirAn experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

Video: Chapter 7:Bankruptcy Liquidation

‘Octomom’s’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy dismissed

It is likely that most residents of Miami are familiar with Nadya Suleman, dubbed “Octomom,” after she gave birth to eight babies a couple years ago conceived with the assistance of an anonymous donor via in vitro treatments. When she gave birth to the octuplets in January 2009, she became mother to a total of 14 children. Despite providing indications that she would be able to capitalize on her new found fame, few have come to fruition and the single unemployed mother recently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Source: miamibankruptcylawfirmblog.com

Phoenix Bankruptcy Attorney Blog

Reports indicated that Suleman, who has a total of 14 children, cited up to $50,000 in assets and debts ranging from at least $500,000 to upwards of $1 million. Her debtors include Verizon Wireless, Southern California Edison, the Department of Motor Vehicles, DirecTV, the water department of the city of La Habra, her father, a gardener, Sylvan Learning Center and a private school, to name a few.
Source: maricopacountybankruptcyattorney.com

‘Octomom’ Seeks Debt Relief by Filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Public scrutiny. Soon, media outlets began questioning Suleman’s ability to raise 14 children as a single mother. Suleman eventually admitted to ABC News that she was receiving between $4,000 and $5,000 each month in public assistance, but this may not have been enough to provide for her massive family.
Source: clearbankruptcy.com

Get Free Bankruptcy Advice for Filing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Online

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

The Credit Counseling Requirement in Bankruptcy

Rome visit, June 2008 - 57 by Ed YourdonIf you file a bankruptcy case without taking the credit counseling first, then your case may be dismissed or it may be determined to be void right from the outset.  I will not file a bankruptcy case for a client unless they have completed the credit counseling and debt credit counseling must be completed within 180 days of the filing.  I have had clients who have taken the credit counseling and that they did not move very quickly on their case and they wound up having to take the credit counseling again.
Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com

Video: Debt Settlement: Your Alternative To Bankruptcy, Credit Counseling or Debt Consolidation

Does Credit Counselling Really Work?

It takes 1-3 months to get a proof with sales in the event the asset may be available. Prior to the confirmation is usually complete, the borrower may well contest your sale, nevertheless doesnt have a correct associated with redemption. The only lien members in whose contraptions carry through your sales on the town at the trustees sales or even foreclosure public sale could be the IRS, first mortgage, and asset duty. The money owed to your minute house loan will doubtless unfastened this security to be tied to the worth on the town, whether it is as well offered with public sale or "taken back" with the traditional bank. Theyre just there fore much more willing to preserve which secured job just by helping your home proprietor stay away from the sales on the town. That description with the foreclosure process is provided since informative only. The internet, nevertheless regarded as being accurate, is not certain to be comprehensive. . The world of business personal bankruptcy law may be complex together with daunting. Dont allow confusion acquire with respect to producing the most effective decisions to your company: please read on to obtain answers on the most frequently asked business personal bankruptcy questions. Q. Precisely what is bankruptcy? Some sort of. Each time a business provides finance liabilities that will surpass their own possessions and struggles to meet debt, that company is usually insolvent-unable to pay their own loaners, the firm ought to arrived at an deal with the loaners concerning repayment and file for bankruptcy protection. The following judicial answer provides legal courts the power to settle that companys debts. Chapter 13 process may be initiated with the borrower or even by the creditor (called an involuntary individual bankruptcy). Declaring some sort of individual bankruptcy petition affects all of your current creditors including: Guaranteed loaners (those with a lien on the house) Unsecured loan companies (distributors, credit card companies while others without a protection interest in your stuff Judgment loaners (creditors with sued and secured a wisdom with borrower before the bankruptcy completing) Loan companies using extremely precedence claims (include those with concern across many other collectors because of distinctive rules within the chapter 13) Loaners with administrative comments (loaners like accountants or lawyers using precedence because of their assistance inside chapter 13 declaring) Queen. What will do completing for chapter 13 necessarily mean with regard to my business? A. Filing some sort of personal bankruptcy petition just starts some sort of legal proceeding, with no ensures the outcome. That is to say, this borrower will present proof its insolvency, nevertheless there is no guarantee that trial can declare these bankrupt. That statutory process supplies collectors and other people the opportunity to help obstacle this debtors suggestions together with objective to the aid being needed by way of the borrower. Completing with regard to individual bankruptcy does right away put into influence a great "automatic continue to be, " a great injunction which halts collectors from wanting to get hold of their debts before bankruptcy in the court principles. Delaware Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Laws, Delaware Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Laws, Bankruptcy Laws In DelawareQuite a while back, that Our lawmakers associated with the united states overhauled the united states Govt chapter 13 legislation in the Individual bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Customer Protection Act with 2005. Source: skyrock.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Minneapolis Bankruptcy Credit Counseling

It takes 1-3 months to get a proof with sales in the event the asset may be available. Prior to the confirmation is usually complete, the borrower may well contest your sale, nevertheless doesnt have a correct associated with redemption. The only lien members in whose contraptions carry through your sales on the town at the trustees sales or even foreclosure public sale could be the IRS, first mortgage, and asset duty. The money owed to your minute house loan will doubtless unfastened this security to be tied to the worth on the town, whether it is as well offered with public sale or "taken back" with the traditional bank. Theyre just there fore much more willing to preserve which secured job just by helping your home proprietor stay away from the sales on the town. That description with the foreclosure process is provided since informative only. The internet, nevertheless regarded as being accurate, is not certain to be comprehensive. . The world of business personal bankruptcy law may be complex together with daunting. Dont allow confusion acquire with respect to producing the most effective decisions to your company: please read on to obtain answers on the most frequently asked business personal bankruptcy questions. Q. Precisely what is bankruptcy? Some sort of. Each time a business provides finance liabilities that will surpass their own possessions and struggles to meet debt, that company is usually insolvent-unable to pay their own loaners, the firm ought to arrived at an deal with the loaners concerning repayment and file for bankruptcy protection. The following judicial answer provides legal courts the power to settle that companys debts. Chapter 13 process may be initiated with the borrower or even by the creditor (called an involuntary individual bankruptcy). Declaring some sort of individual bankruptcy petition affects all of your current creditors including: Guaranteed loaners (those with a lien on the house) Unsecured loan companies (distributors, credit card companies while others without a protection interest in your stuff Judgment loaners (creditors with sued and secured a wisdom with borrower before the bankruptcy completing) Loan companies using extremely precedence claims (include those with concern across many other collectors because of distinctive rules within the chapter 13) Loaners with administrative comments (loaners like accountants or lawyers using precedence because of their assistance inside chapter 13 declaring) Queen. What will do completing for chapter 13 necessarily mean with regard to my business? A. Filing some sort of personal bankruptcy petition just starts some sort of legal proceeding, with no ensures the outcome. That is to say, this borrower will present proof its insolvency, nevertheless there is no guarantee that trial can declare these bankrupt. That statutory process supplies collectors and other people the opportunity to help obstacle this debtors suggestions together with objective to the aid being needed by way of the borrower. Completing with regard to individual bankruptcy does right away put into influence a great "automatic continue to be, " a great injunction which halts collectors from wanting to get hold of their debts before bankruptcy in the court principles. Delaware Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Laws, Delaware Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Laws, Bankruptcy Laws In DelawareQuite a while back, that Our lawmakers associated with the united states overhauled the united states Govt chapter 13 legislation in the Individual bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Customer Protection Act with 2005. Source: skyrock.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Minneapolis Bankruptcy Credit Counseling

A pre-bankruptcy counseling session with an approved credit counseling organization should include an evaluation of your personal financial situation, a discussion of alternatives to bankruptcy, and a personal budget plan. A typical counseling session should last about 60 to 90 minutes, and can take place in person, on the phone, or online. The counseling organization is required to provide the counseling free of charge for those consumers who cannot afford to pay. If you cannot afford to pay a fee for credit counseling, you should request a fee waiver from the counseling organization before the session begins. Otherwise, you may be charged a fee for the counseling, which will generally be about $50, depending on where you live, the types of services you receive, and other factors. The counseling organization is required to discuss any fees with you before starting the counseling session.
Source: minnesotaattorney.com

The Rising Cost of Going Bankrupt

The cost of bankruptcy rose sharply following passage of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which introduced sweeping reforms to the bankruptcy process. These changes include mandatory credit counseling and financial education courses, additional legal documents, increased filing fees and an updated “means test” to determine bankruptcy eligibility. The burden of paying for all of these added requirements, including the increased attorney hours needed to prepare the filing, falls to the debtor.
Source: lawyers.com

When to File for Bankruptcy

As a credit consultant, my clients always ask me when to file for bankruptcy. As a result, I advise them to file only when you have exhausted all of your available avenues such as talking with your credit card company, car, and mortgage lenders and your student loan representative about the various options you have to explore. You should also look into Consumer credit counseling organizations, debt consolidation, balance transfers and taping your savings and investments. If none of these options worked, and your debt exceeds your annual salary, then it’s time to talk with a bankruptcy lawyer. Moreover, you must look at your advantages and disadvantages to filing.
Source: ezinemark.com

One Million Americans Are “Too Poor” To Go Bankrupt

The study also revealed that paperwork filing typically only costs $300 while the rest of the fee needed for a bankruptcy goes to the law firm representing a client. Other fees also add to the cost including mandatory pre-bankruptcy credit counseling and a pre-discharge debtor education course. Lawyers for their part claim higher fees are now necessary because they are being forced to jump through more hoops now than they have been required to jump through in the past, causing longer work hours to be claimed in order to complete the average bankruptcy.
Source: inquisitr.com

Credit Counseling Required 6 Months Before Filing Bankruptcy

“The smartest thing to do is to talk to a bankruptcy attorney first,” Osenton said. “An attorney’s experience pays off as people try to find the best way through their situation. Credit counseling is an important part of the process. There is a good reason why the justice department wants people to go through it, and it is important for that part of the process to be regulated.”
Source: lawfirmnewswire.com